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STATEMENT 8 P  TEE CASE 
N A T W  OF THE CASE: 
This is an appeal by the State of Idaho of the decision of the District Court, sitting as an 
Appellant Court, reversing the Magistrate's Judgment of conviction of the Defendant for the crime 
of Littering, in violation of LC. $ 18-3906. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS, AM) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Defendant Tams, while operating a Tractor Trailer loaded with livestock made a low speed 
turn onto U.S. Highway 95, and an undetermined quantity of brownish liquid escaped the Trailer 
onto the public highway. It is undisputed that it was a mixture of rainwater, manure and urine, all 
generated in transit from Canada to Boundary County while traveling to a meat processing plant in 
Eastern Washington. The officer cited the Defendant for a violation of LC. $ 18-3906. The 
Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint on three grounds: C.R.P. 16 &17, (1) the conduct is 
not prohibited by LC. $18-3906; (2) I.C. 518-3906, as applied to the present facts, is void for 
vagueness, and (3) to permit local enforcement of the statute would require interstateIintemationa1 
transportation to make substantial modifications to livestock transportation trailers to avoid 
violations, which would result in an undue burden on Interstate transportation of livestock. All of 
which is a violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The Magistrate 
denied Defendant's motion, and the case proceeded to trid before a Magisfrate without a jury, 
where the Defendant was convicted of violating LC.$ 18-3906. 
Defendant timely appealed the judgment of the Magistrate to the District Court where the 
District Court, sitting as an appellate Court, reversed the Magistrate for two reasons. First, there 
was an absence of evidence of intent, or criminal negligence by the Defendant, and secondly, that a 
1 
mixture of cattle urine, feces, and rain is not debris, or waste substance, as set forth in I.C. $18- 
3906. 
It is from the decision of the District Court reversing the Magistrate vacating the judgment 
that the State now appeals. 
1. Whether the District Court ruled correctly in determining that the trial Court's 
W i g  that the Defendant acted negligently is not support by the record of the evidence presented at 
trial. 
2. Whether the District Court ruled correctly in its determination that a liquid mixture 
of rainwater and livestock urine and feces did not fall within the terminology "debris, litter, trash, 
garbage, or other waste substance", as those terms are used in LC.§ 18-3906. 
ARGUMENT 
The facts are quite simple; however understanding the facts is more complex. T o  understand 
the facts, one must understand the mechanics of the international transport of livestock. The 
Defendant, was hauling cattle from feed lots in Canada to a meat processing plant in Washington 
State. While carefully and lawfully making a slow speed lefi turn on to U.S. Highway 95, a 
quantity of liquid manure discharged from the trailer onto the public roadway in Boundary County. 
This is the basis ofthe charge and conviction of Defendant for a violation of LC. 518-3906, 
Boundary County, as it's name suggests, is the County in Idaho that is located immediately 
adjacent to the international border with Canada. U.S. 95 is a primary transportation route for 
livestock fiom Eastern British Columbia and Western Saskatchewan, Canada, south through Idaho 
to meat packing plants in Eastern Washington. Canadian traffic hauling livestock out of Canada 
into the United States proceeds south into the United States, crossing the international border at 
Eastport, Idaho, in Boundary County. 
Eastport is a port designated for the importation of cattle into the United States. 
USDNAPHIS, Sec. $93-403 Ports designated for the importation of ruminates. 
"(a) Canadian border ports. The following land border ports are designated as 
having the necessary inspection facilities for the entry of ruminants from Canada. 
Eastport, Idaho.. ." 
Western Saskatchewan, Canada, is a major livestock producing area for beef which is 
processed and distributed within the United States. A necessary function of the industry is 
transporting the livestock from the feed lots in Canada, by truck, south across th.e international 
border at Eastport, Idaho, continuing south on U.S. 95 through Bonners Ferry and Boundary County 
to Interstate 90. At that point, they travel west on Interstate 90 to packing plants in Eastern 
Washington where the livestock is slaughtered, and the meat is processed for distribution in the 
United States. 
In the international transport of livestock into the United States, the bxckers and, in 
particular, the Defendant, Clarence Tams, use equipment manufactured in the United S-tates built to 
United States Department of Transportation standards. In the present case the Defendant was 
hauling livestock in a trailer owned by Vanee Livestock. The trailer was manufacnired in the 
United States, and was purchased new by Vanee Livestock in July of 2006. At the date in question, 
it had been in use for approximately 10 month, (see Trial Transcript, Page 28-Line 5 through Page 
29-Lime 8 and Page 30-Lie 1 through Page 3 1-Line 7). In the present case, as with all international 
transport of livestock from Canada into the U.S., the procedure is that before loadin& the interior of 
the trailer is washed clean of manure and inspected for mechanical defects, particularly the floor 
drains which are then closed and locked. (Trial Transcript. P. 34 L2-L15, P. 70 L13, P.71 L25.) 
Before being loaded into the trailer, the livestock are examined by a government veterinarian, as a 
requirement of United States law for importation into the United States. After inspection, and after 
the trailer is cleaned, the livestock are loaded, the trailer doors are closed and latched, and the 
government veterinarian seals the trailer door with an official government inspection seal (Trial 
Transcript P. 34, L.20, Trial Transcript P. 35, L. 35) which, pursuant to United States Federal Law, 
is unlawful for the driver, or any unauthorized person, to break or remove. USDA/APMS, Sec $93- 
420(a) provides, as follows: 
USDNSPEIIS, sec. "$93-420 Ruminants from Canada for Immediate slaughter. 
(a)RWates imported from Canada for immediate slaughter must be imported only 
through a port of entry listed in §93-403(b) or as provided for in $93-4030 in a 
means of convevance sealed in Canada with seals of the Canadian Government, and 
must be moved directly as a group from the port of entry to a recognized 
slaughtering establishment for slaughter as a group. The seals must be broken only 
at the port of entry by the APHIS port veterinarian or at the recognized slaughtering 
establislment by an authorized USDA representative. If the seals are broken b v  the 
APHlS port veterinarian at the port of entw the means of conveyance must be 
resealed with seals of the U.S. Government before being moved to the recomized 
slaughtering establishment. The shipment must be accompanied from the port of 
entry to the recognized slaughtering establishment by APHIS form VS 17-33, which 
shall include the location of the recognized slaughtering establishment. Such 
ruminates shall be inspected at the port of entry and otherwise handled in accordance 
with 393-408." (Emphasis added). 
In the transport from Westem Saskatchewan to the meat processing plant in Westem 
Washington, there are no facilities to clean the manure that accumulates in the trailer during transit. 
The border crossing inspection by United States authorities at the Eastport port of entry consists of 
checking the paper work, confirmation that the official seal is intact, the load corresponds to the 
documents and that the animals are all standing. (Trial Transcript P. 36, L12-L21) The interior of 
the trailer is not accessed at the border, or from the point of loading to the point of unloading at the 
processing plant in the United States, in conformity with United States law. USDNAPHIS Sec 93- 
420(a). 
The floor drains (see State's Exhibits 2 & 5, and Defendant's Exhibit A) are installed in 
cattle trailers by the manufacturer for the purpose of flushing out the manure when cleaning the 
trailer. To open the drains while the trailer is loaded with livestock, would create the risk of an 
animal putting a leg down the drain hole, possibly breaking it, or grinding off a hoof on the 
pavement below. (Trial Transcript P. 68, L-10, P. 69, L-14). For this reason, among others, the 
floor drain handles used to open and close the drains are located on the exterior of the trailer and 
are locked with a pin (see State's Exhibits 2 & 5, and Defendant's Exhibit A) to avoid accidental 
opening and injury to the livestock. The aluminum drain cover, andlor the adjacent aluminum 
floor, will occasionally flex when an animal shifts its weight, causing the cover and/or the floor 
to  flex, allowing liquefied manure to escape through the drain. (Trial Transcript P. 52, L20, P. 
53, L-1, P. 58, L-20-59). Manure can also escape through ventilation holes that are located in the 
sides of the trailer. These ventilation holes are designed into the sides of the trailer to permit the 
flow of air over the cargo. (See State's Exhibits 2 and 5). Without airflow, the animals will 
overheat and contract shipping fever, which is a form of pneumonia caused by overheating the 
animal. Overheating the animals may also result in darkening the meat, reducing its quality and 
value. (Trial Transcript, Page 41-Line 2 through Line 24) 
Preceding the events the Defendant stands charged with, it is undisputed that Defendant 
followed the protocol described above. He washed out the trailer, closed, inspected and pinned the 
floor drains. After the Government Veterinarian inspected the cattle, they were loaded. The trailer 
door was then closed, and the Government veterinarian sealed the trailer doors with his ofticial 
seal. This made it physically impossible to remove the cattle eom the tmiler without violating 
United States Federal Law. (See USDA/APHIS, Sec $93-420(a), Supra.). Defendant then 
transported the livestock from the point of loading to the U.S. border, approximately 4 hours of this 
part of the trip, was through a driving rainstorm. (Trial Transcript P. 74, L1, P. 75, L-23, Trial 
Transcript P. 89, L-12-23). Of course, tbis added a substantial amount of rainwater to the manure 
normally generated in the transport of livestock. The undisputed testimony was that by the time the 
Defendant had reached Bonners Ferry, the load of livestock he was transporting would have 
generated approximately one and one-half (1 % ) tons of manure and urine (Trial Transcript, Page 
39-Lie 1 through Page 40- l ie  25. In addition to the manure and urine, there would have been an 
undetermined, but substantial quantity of rainwater added. 
After crossing the border and before reaching Bonners Ferry, the Defendant pulled off the 
road into a truck stop at the Intersection of U.S. Highway 95 and U.S. Highway 2, commonly 
referred to as "Three Mile Junction", appropriately named, as it is located approximately 3 miles 
north of Bonners Fenry, Idaho. His purpose for pulling off the highway was to equalize the weight 
on the trailer axels with the trailer's air system.(Trial Transcript P. 78, Lll-17, and  L21-25) 
(Defendant's Exhibit C). To re-enter the highway he turned onto U.S. 2 and drove a few yards, 
stopping at the intersection with U.S. 95. At this intersection, he made a left hand turn baclc onto 
U.S. 95 southbound at a low rate of speed, during which an undetermined amount of liquid manure 
escaped fiom the trailer immediately in f'ront of the trailer wheels, suggesting it was through a floor 
drain. (Trial Transcript P. 80, L8-25). The fact that there was no leaking of manure before or after 
this, would suggest the left hand tum resulted in an animal shiRing its weight onto a foot placed on 
a floor drain cover, or the adjacent aluminum floor, causing it to flex briefly, thereby allowing the 
rainwater, urine and manure mixture to escape through a gap between the floor and the drain cover. 
There is no evidence that the Defendant operated the tmck in a manner so as to intentionally or 
negligently cause the load to shift. From that point until Defendant had parsed almost completely 
through the town of Bonners Feny, a distance of several miles, the Defendant operated the tmck in 
compliance with all traffic laws, staying at, or below, the posted speed, resulting in no M e r  
discharge of manure. Only &er the officer stopped the Defendant on uneven ground, did a small 
amount of liquid manure escape through the vent holes located in the low side of the trailer. (State's 
Exhibit 4). 
LACK OF PROOF OF INTENT OR NEGLIGENCE 
The first issue is the burden of proof. Did the State meet its burden in proving criminal 
intent and/or negligence? That, of course, will require this Court's review of the trial record. There 
certainly was no proof that the Transportation Department of the State of Idaho complied with the 
notice requirement as stated in LC.§ 18-3906, and the lack of clarity of the statute, insofar as 
applying it to animal waste. It certainly creates a hurdle for the State in proving intent and/or 
creating a standard the Defendant must meet to not be negligent. 
The conduct of the Defendant was, in every respect, consistent with the highesit standard of 
transporting of livestock. Everything from the quality and care of the equipment, to h is  compliance 
with laws, were without fault. To establish a standard of care andfor duty upon which to base 
a f id ' i g  of negligence, the trial court had to specifically disregard the undisputed evidence that 
there was no location or facility between the point of loading and the point of this event which 
would have enabledthe Defendant to clean and dispose of the excess liquid caused by the  rain. The 
trial court had to create a disposal facility out of thin air, when the undisputed testimony was that 
one did not exist. The trial court went beyond both the law, and the evidence, and ruled that the 
Defendant should locate a .farm pasture to drain off the excess liquid. Imagine proceeding down 
the highway driving a livestock transport truck, attached to a 53 foot trailer M y  loaded, having to 
drive a mile or two up a private road, in order to seek permission to dump tons of a mixture of 
water, urine, and manure on a farmer's field. (Trial Tmcript,  P. 94, L-20-23). That is absolute 
absurdity which the law should not, and does not, require. What if the f m e r  does not consent? Do 
you dump it anyway? 
The manure which escaped &om the trailer in both events was due to no act or omission of 
the Defendant, either intentionally or negligently. The escaping manure occurred in the normal 
course of transporting livestock from the feed lot to the processing plant, using the most recent 
equipment manufactured in the United States to United States Deparbnent of Transportation 
standards, and operated in compliance with the traffic laws of the State of Idaho, Boundary County, 
and the City of Bonners Ferry, Idaho. The occasional slopping of manure during transport from the 
feed lots to processing plants is an unavoidable occurrence in the process of production and 
processing of the beef, as is the odor of the manure. In short, the Magistrate set rssl impossible 
standard for anyone to meet. 
The statute under which the Defendant was charged and convicted, by its terns  does not 
purport to regulate the livestock industry, nor does it make specific reference to animal waste of 
any type or nature. Idaho Code $1 8-3906 states in pertinent part, as follows: 
818-3906. Placing debris on hi&ways. - (1) If any person shall willfully or negligently 
throw from a vehicle, place, deposit or permit to be deposited upon or alongside of any highway, 
street, alley or easement used by the public for public travel, any debris, paper, litter, glass bottle, 
glass, nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, lighted material, o r  other 
waste substance, . . ." 
This statute is certainly not a malum in se law, but rather is a malun prohibiturn law. 
Malum prohibiturn laws make acts or omissions unlawful only because the law makes them 
uniawful, not because they are inherently wrong, Blacks Law Dictionary, 4% Ed. This places a 
burden on the state to notify the public that such act or conduct has been made unlawfid by the 
legislature. Recognizing that fact, LC. 18-3906 continues on to require notification .to the public 
that the act is unlawful. 
I.C. 818-3906 goes on to state, "The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to post 
along state highways, at convenient and appropriate places, notices of the context of this law", 
(Emphasis added). By reason of this notice requirement upon the Idaho Transportation Department, 
to prove such an offense the state must prove the Idaho Transportation Department complied with 
the notice requirement. The trial record is absent any evidence that the Department complied with 
the statute to put international drivers or passengers coming out of Canada on notice of the "context 
of said law", let alone its existence. Failure of compliance with the notice requirement results in 
the traveling public not being infonned that a1 otherwise lawful act has, by statule, been made 
unlawful. Were this a malum in se law, such notice to the public would not be necessary, as 
anyone would, or should, know the conduct was wrong. However LC. $18-3906 is clearly a 
malum prohibiturn law. It is an act that the state decrees unlawful, and only because the law makes 
it unlawful, is it unlawful, not because the very nature of the prohibited acts are violative of natural, 
moral andlor public law. 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
In State v. Kavajecz, (2003), 139, Id. 482,80 P3d 1083, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis. 
"The doctrine of ejusdein generis, a rule of statutory construction that finds where 
general words of a statute. follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general 
words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or 
character to those specifically enumerated." State v. Hurt. 135 Idaho 827, 831,  25 
~ . 3 ' ~  850, 854 (2001. 
In recognizing the application of this rule to criminal statutes, the Court in Kavajecz took 
great pains to emphasize the constitutional importance of criminal statutes being plain and 
unmistakable so the common person is put on notice that a particular conduct is clearly unlawfkl. 
The Court did so by quoting the United States Supreme Court, as follows: 
"The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a criminal statute must 
give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.. .." Bouie v. Citv of  Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347,350,84 S.Ct. 1697, 1701, 12 L.Ed.2d 894,898 (1964), and "before a 
man can be punished as a criminal under the [ 1 law his case must be 'plainly and 
unmistakably' within the provision of some statute." United States v. Gradwell, 
243, U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 411, 61 L.Ed. 857, 864 (1917). Due process 
reauires "what Justice Holmes spoke of as 'fair warning ... in language that the 
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed. To make the warning clear' " Unitedstates v. Lanier. 520, U.S. 259, 
265,117 S.Ct. 1219,1224,137 L.Ed.2d 432,442 (1997). Emphasis added. 
The unambiguous clarity of criminal statutes is a constitutional right of due process that 
everyone affected by the law is entitled to. The very fact that two Magistrates, and a District judge 
would disagree whether the "catch all" terms used in the statute encompasses manure, strongly 
suggest that their application to manme is not clear, and therefore does not meet ihe c~nstitutional 
due process requirement. 
In Penvle vs. Goldman, 1878, 1 Id 714, fbe Supreme Court of the Tenitory csf Idaho, the 
Court focused on the importance of d e t e e g  legislative intent in interpreting statutes. The Court 
stated: "A tbing which is within the intention of the maker of the statute is as much within the 
statute as if it were within the letter; and atbing which is within the letter of the statute is not within 
the statute unless it is within the intention of the makers." (Emphasis added). In coastruing the 
statute in question, the Court applied the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In applying the 
rule to the statute, the court determined that the legislature intended that, "...certain games might be 
kept on being licensed, and that certain others should be unlawful, they intend that the keeping of all 
games not named in the act should be legalized ..." Goldman 716, Id. (Emphasis added). This rule 
recited by the Cpurt in Goldman was later referred to in Pepvle vs. Headrick 64 Id 132, 128P2d 
575, as the doctrine of "ejusdem generis:' holding that the statute supplemented the common law in 
relation to games of chance." 
The Court in Goldman is clearly saying that in interpreting a statute one needs to determine 
the intent of the legislature. In the present case, the common law and pre-existing statutes did not 
prohibit the placing of debris on the highway. The traveling public began to throw items from 
vehicles, such as papers, bottles, cans, lighted cigarettes and other such litter, which both unsightly, 
and a danger to persons and property. The legislature saw fit to prohibit the practice. As noted by 
the District Judge, the common characteristic of the listed items is that they are tangible solid items 
that can be picked up and removed. Manure in the present case is a liquid which c m o t  be picked 
up to remove. A second common characteristic of the specifically listed items is that they are not 
bio-degradable, as is manure, so the listed items remain visable for days, if not weeks, months and 
years. The liquid slurry of manure, in the present case, was no longer even visible t h e  next day. 
(Trial Transcript P. 90, L24-P.91-Ll). A third common characteristic is that not one of the 
specifically listed items is an agricultural With the single exception of "lighted malerial" 
they are a!.l the debris of used manufactured products, which manure is not. Certainly, liquid 
material, unless combustible, has no common characteristic with burning material. 
Certainly, used in proper context the meaning of the words "debris" and "littei' can, and do, 
include animal waste. However, that is not the case in I.C.fj18-3906. The English Language has 
many words that, depending on usage, have unrelated meanings. With such words, t o  determine 
the intended meaning one must consider the context in which they are used. A simple example is 
the word blue. Is it a state of emotion or a color? The word must be put into context to know which 
meaning is applicable. The word "high" to a drug addict has one meaning, but to an  engineer, 
architect, or a mountain climber, it has an entirely different meaning. The different meanings of 
each word have no relationship to one another. 
Counsel for Appellant correctly cites the Idaho Court's recent decision, State v. Harrison, 
147 I. 678, 214, P.2d. 664. The importance of this case as stated by the Court is the need of 
determining statutory intent. The relevant portion of the case can be broken into three parts. 
"[8-101 When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to 
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 
462. 988 P.2d at 688." 
"To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the 
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the 
stahte and its legislative history." (Emphasis added). 
"Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretatio~z that will not 
render it a nuility. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 ~ . 3 ' ~  116,121 (Ct App. 
2001). A construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. 
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 52J, 52.5,(2004); State v. Yager, 139 
Idaho 680, 690, 85 ~ . 3 ' ~  656, 666 (2004). " 
It is clear hat it was the intent and purpose of the legislature lo separately regulate the waste 
products of the livestock industry, particularly the beef cattle industry. This further emphasizes that 
it was not the legislative intent to apply the general terms used in I.C.318-3906 to animal waste. To 
tlis end, the legislature saw fit @to delegate the regulation of the livestock industry t o  the whims 
and politics of local law enforcement by use of the general criminal statutes and process. 
Recognizing the economic importance to the State of the livestock industry, in general, and 
to the beef cattle industry, in particular, and the potential for controversy over its waste products, 
urine and manure, the legislature established a comprehensive scheme to regulate such. Title 25, 
Chapter 38, and Title 22, Chapter 49, establishes comprehensive staMory schemes to regulate not 
only the manure, but the odor that emanates from it, placing regulatory authority in the Department 
of Agiculture to balance the need to protect the vitally important livestock industry. At the same 
time, it is charged with the duty to minimize the nuisance of excessive animal waste and its inherent 
objectionable characteristics that negatively impact quality of life for the general public. Legislative 
intent to separately regulate manure generated by the livestock industry and the beef cattle industry, 
in particular, is clearly shown by the following sections of the Idaho Code. 
Manure is deftned by Statute. 
"LC. $22-4904(7) 'Manure' means animal excrement that may also contain bedding, 
spilled feed, water and soil." 
"I.C.325-3803(9) 'Manure' means animal excrement k t  may also contain bedding 
spilled feed or soil" 
"1.C. 322-4902 (1)(2) Declaration of policy and statement of legislative intent. (1) 
The legislature recognizes the importance of protecting state natural resources 
inc1ud.ing s d c e  water and ground water. It is the intent of the legislahue to protect 
the quality of these natural resources while maintaining an ecologically sound, 
economicallv viable, and socially responsible beef cattle industry in the state. 
beef cattle industrv produces manure and process wastewater which, when promerly 
used. supplies valuable nuhients and organic matter to soils and is arotective o f  the 
environment, but may, when improperly stored and managed, create adverse impacts 
on natural resources, including waters of the state. This chapter is intended to emure 
that manure and process wastewater associated with beef cattle operations are 
handled in a manner which protects the natural resources of the state. 
(2) Further, the legislature recognizes that the beef cattle industrv is potentially 
subject to various state and federal laws designed to protect state natural resowces 
and that the Idaho department of amiculture is in the best position to administer and 
implement these various laws. It is therefore the intent of the legislature that the 
administration of this law by the department of agriculture fully meets the goals and 
requirement of the federal clean water act and state laws designed to further protect 
state waters and that administration of this chapter by the department of agriculture 
shall not be more shingent than or broader in scope than the requirements o f  the 
clean water act and apilicable state and federal l a k .  The department shall have 
authoritv to administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the confines of 
a beef cattle animal feeding operation In out this chapter, the department 
shall prioritize its resources on operation which have the greatest potential to 
signi6cantly impact the environment and ensure that am requirements immosed 
under this chapter upon operators of beef cattle animal feeding o~erations are cost- 
effective and economically. environmentally and technologicallv feasible." 
"I.C. $22-4909 Enforcement. (1) Informal administrative resolution of 
noncompliance. When the director identifies items of non-compliance at a beef 
cattle animal feeding operation, the deficiencies will be noted and appropriate 
corrective actions will be identified an schedule infomally. When corrective actions 
cannot be commenced within thirty (3) days and completed within a reasonable 
time, the director may negotiate a compliance order as  specified in subsection (2(b) 
of this section." 
"(2) (a) Administrative enforcement. Any beef cattle animal feeding operation 
not complying with the provisions of this act mav be assessed a civil penaltv by the 
director ... by the issuance of a notice of noncompliance. The notice of 
noncompliance shall identifv the alleeed violation with speciticitv.. . ." 
''0 The notice of noncompliance shall inform the person to whom it is directed of 
an oppoizuni~ to confer with the director .... The compliance conference shall 
provide an opportnnity for the recipient of a notice of noncom~liance to emlain the 
circumstances of the alleged violation and. where aoprotxiate, to present a proposal 
for remedying damage.. .." 
"(3) Civil enforcement. The director may initiate a civil enforcement action through 
the attorney general. Civil enforcement actions shall be commenced and prosecuted 
in the district court in and for the county in which the alleged violation occurred, and 
may be brought against any person who is alleged to have violated any provision of 
this act or any permit or order which has become effective pursuant to this act. Such 
action may be brought to compel compliance with any provision of this act or with 
any permit or order promulgated hereunder and for any relief or remedies authoxized 
in this act." 
Declaration of policy generally applicable to agriculture as a whole. 
"I.C.§25-3801. Beclaraeiom of policy md statement of legislative intent. 
(1) The agriculture industry is a vital component of Idaho's economy and during 
the normal course of producing the food and fiber required by Idaho a n d  our 
nation, odors are generated. It is the intent of the legislature to manage Shese 
odors when they are generated at a level in excess of those odors i iomdly  
associated with accepted agricultd practices in Idaho.. ." 
(2) ... the beef cattle indusky will address odor manaeement as needed through 
implementation of the beef cattle environmental control act as vrovided For in 
chapter 49, title 22, Idaho Code, and rules promulgated thereunder." 
(3) 'The Idaho department of agriculture is hereby authorized as the lead agency to 
administer and implement the provisions of this chapter. In carrying ou t  the 
provision of this chapter, the deuartment will make reasonable efforts to e r n e  
that anv requirement imposed upon aericultud o~erations are cost-effective and 
economicallv. environmentally and tecbnolorricallv feasible. [I.C.$ 25-380 1, as 
added by 2001, ch. 383,s 1, p.1340; am.202, ch.261,$ 1, p.781.1 
"I.C. 525-3807, Complaints. - The department shall respond to all odor 
comvlaints lodged against adculture oueration. A complaint must include the 
name, address and telephone number of the complainant. The response of the 
department may be limited to informing the complainant that an odor plan is 
being implemented. Complaints pursuant to this section are a public record open 
to public inspection and copying pursuant to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code. 
[I.C.$25-3807, as added by 2001, ch. 383,s 1, p. 1340.r 
The foregoing excerpts &om Chapter 49 of Title 22 and Chapter 38 of Title 25 o f  the Idaho 
Code are clear indicators that the legislature recognized the unavoidable problems of some facets of 
the agricultural industry. The legislature clearly recognizes that agriculture is of major importance 
to the economy of Idaho. The legislature further recognized the stress inherent between society as a 
whole, and the industry in particular. They recognized those undesirable aspects of the industry that 
are unavoidably incidental to production. Society wants paper, but doesn't like the odor incidental 
to producing it. Society wants meat and leather goods but, again, does not want to pay the price in 
discomfort caused by the odor, or occasional escaping waste. The legislature recognizes these 
undesirable aspects of the industry are controllable, but at a financial cost that increases the price of 
the products. The legislature recognized that local enforcement of restrictions on those undesirable 
aspects of agriculture will be heavily affected by attitudes of the local populace dealing with such 
problems. The local government would not visualize the overall economic impact of how the 
undesirable aspects of the industry are handled. For that reason, the legislature intentionally 
established Chapter 38 of Title 25, and Chapter 49 of Title 22, for the Department of Agriculture to 
regulate those issues and ininimize their negative aspects, thereby enabling the industry to 
economically and practically produce the product in a cost effective practical manner. It is for that 
reason the legislature saw fit to intentionallv omit fkom I.C.5 18-3906 any reference t o  agricultural 
waste products, particularly those generated by the livestock industry. 
There is, of course, language in Chapter 38, Title 25, and Chapter 49 of Title 22, that would 
suggest that this regulatory authority is l i i t e d  to feed lots. Again, wbat is the legislative intent? 
Does it make sense that agriculture is protected in the feed lot, but not in the transport between the 
feed lots and the processing plant? The livestock in the feed lots provide no economic value to the 
industry, the economy of the state, or benefit to consumers, unless it can be moved &om the feed 
lots to processing plants. To exclude application of Chapter 38, Title 25, or Chapter 49, Title 22 to 
the movement of livestock fkom feed lot to packing plant and make LC.§ 18-3906 applicable would 
permit local government to circumvent the Department of Agriculture. TlGs effectively, in a 
practical sense, renders these two chapters of the code a nullity, leading to an absurd result. 
Imagine local law enforcement conducting a m u r e  oatrol. similar to dmnk driver or  cross walk 
m. Envision a line of patrol cars parked along the route between the feed lot and packing plant 
waiting for an animal to back against an air vent in a transport truck and discharge waste. What 
better way to shut down the industry, especially if local authorities choose to exercise their 
discretion to mest drivers, instead of cite drivers, and impose the maximum penalties a f  a $300.00 
fine or, worse yet, 10 days in jail. Assume a driver is arrested hauling a full load of livestock on a 
hot day, and does not have the money to post bail. What happens to the load? What happens if the 
clriver bails out, or a replacenlent driver comes to move the truck, and the same thing happens again. 
After the driver moves the truck one or two blocks, another animal backs up against am air vent and 
unloads again. 
It is easy to distinguish the present case f a c t d y  because the load originabd isa. Canada and 
is in route to a packing plant in Washington state. Passing &.rough Boundary County ha. oilly 
minimal economic benefit to Idaho, in this case the purchase of a pack of cigarettes. However, the 
rule of law that applies in the present case will have to be applied in the same manner to cattle 
trucks hauling livestock fiom a field or feed lot in Idaho, Adams, or Valley County through the 
pretty resort community of McCall, in route to a meat processing plant, or feed lot in Canyon 
County. The only distinction between the two cases is that, in the case before the Court the 
economic benefit is minimal, and in the illustration, one hundred percent of the economic benefit is 
to the industry within the State of Idaho. To permit an application of the law in a manner that will 
give preferential treatment to intrastate commerce over interstate commerce will, most ceaainly, 
run contrary to the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 
If manure is litter or debris, as used in I.C. 3 18-3906, what was the legislative intent as to 
those vast areas of the State that are open range, ( LC. 325-2118), where livestock move about 
freely across public roads and rights of way? Are open range livestock trained to refrain &om 
depositing urine or manure upon these public rights of way? What is the distinction between a cow 
crapping on a right-of-way while grazing on open range, or being moved fiom the feed lot to the 
processing plant 011 the hoof or by tnrck? Do you prosecute tile owner of the cow gr&g 011 ope11 
range? 
The &ansport of livestock from a feed lot in Canada, by truck, to a packing p l m t  in Wcsienl 
Washington on U.S. 95 and Interstate 90, is not distinguisl~able under the law from the  movement 
of livestock on the hoof, or in a truck %om a feed lot a mile, or many miles, away to a processing 
plant. Transpoit of livestock is part of the process of operating a feed lot and a meat processing 
plant. Without transport, neither can function. 
CmcLUSION 
The record is absent any evidence to establish either criminal intent or evidence of a 
standard that the Defendant fded  to meet, or could have met, that resulted in manure escaping from 
the trailer onto the roadway. The District Court's decision should be affirmed on the issue of failure 
of proof of intent or neghgence. 
The District Judge correctly ruled that items prohibited by LC.§ 18-3906 did not encompass 
the substance at issue, specifically a liquid mix of water, urine and manure. This part of the District 
Court's decision should be affirmed, not only because of the judge's analysis, but on principle of 
legislative intent. 
DATED this &&ay of February, 20 10. 
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